I n a recent set of Federal Register notices, the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) proposed to change the rules under which foreign species listed under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) can be imported into the United States (FWS 2003a (FWS , 2003b . The ESA, although flawed, remains a centerpiece of US legislation protecting and encouraging the recovery of over 985 endangered species of plants and animals found in the United States and 517 species found overseas (see http:// endangered.fws.gov/).
Many conservationists believe that trade in endangered species is usually a threat to the survival of those species. When uncertainty exists concerning the impact of trade, they argue, a precautionary approach dictates that we block such trade except under extraordinary circumstances. In contrast, proponents of regulated wildlife trade argue that trade in endangered species usually enhances the survival of individuals remaining in the wild by giving them value and thus encouraging expenditure on management and protection. Some have called this, cynically perhaps, the "use 'em or lose 'em" argument.
The United States, like many nations, imposes more stringent permitting standards for the importation of an endangered species than is required under CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora). Under CITES, nations wishing to import or export species in the most restricted category (those listed in the convention's appendix I) are required to make a determination that trade "cannot be detrimental to the species in the wild." The US Congress held the United States to a higher standard, requiring that trade in a foreign species listed under the ESA enhance the survival of that species. Congress wanted to ensure that unregulated trade of endangered species did not recurrently result in a "tragedy of the commons."
The logic of the argument that trade is a threat to endangered species is self-evident: Creating a market for an endangered species can lead to overharvesting and decline of that species. The existence of a legal trade in an otherwise protected species may both encourage and facilitate illegal trade, as has been shown for parrots (Wright et al. 2001 ), whales, and a variety of other species. Furthermore, successful captive rearing of an endangered or threatened species for trade may lower the marginal value of protecting wild populations of that species (Thorbjarnarson 1999) . For the most part, limiting trade is the status quo regarding permitting of imports of species listed under ESA.
The arguments in favor of trade as a conservation tool are less direct. Barriers to legal trade may, by reducing the value of such trade, create the perception that the wild population of a species is without value. Owners of the species' habitat may not think it worth investing in conservation of the species or may be unable to raise funds to do so. Furthermore, blocking legal trade may raise the value of specimens in the black market and thus perversely promote illegal trade in the species. In both cases, barriers to trade could be destructive. If most trade in endangered species does in fact improve conservation, then a precautionary approach would suggest that many kinds of trade be allowed unless the regulating authority can show that a specific trade is detrimental to the species.
By its proposed actions, FWS appears to have decided that trade is too tightly restricted. It proposes to significantly expand the "enhancement of survival" exemption under section 10(a) of the ESA. Under this exemption, imports of an ESA-listed species are currently allowed if these imports can be shown to enhance the survival of individuals of the same species still living in the wild. Under the proposed policy, FWS would be able to authorize imports of foreign endangered species if the secretary of the interior decides importation is "reasonably likely" to have a net conservation benefit for the species. The categories of imports that would be affected include skins and hides for commercial sale, live specimens for the pet and entertainment industries, and sport-hunted trophies.
The rationale for this proposed policy change might be defensible if "reasonably likely" were carefully and clearly defined or if the way in which the secretary determines whether an import provides a net "conservation benefit" were specified. But because the necessary definitions are not provided, the proposed decisionmaking process is vague.
Currently, most applications for import licenses under the "enhancement of survival" category are denied unless a strong case is made that the import will produce a conservation benefit. There is thus a strong disincentive to applicants to submit applications that have little or no conservation value. If in the future applications are routinely approved, as the policy and rule changes suggest would happen, the burden of
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JOSHUA GINSBERG proving that an application should be denied would fall on the FWS. This reversal of the burden of proof is an insidious, and frightening, result of the proposed changes. Even if a plurality of applications have real potential conservation benefit, the change in regulatory approach will encourage more frivolous applications and inevitably require that the FWS spend a great deal more time and money evaluating such applications. The FWS is already underfunded and understaffed. Processing of applications for any ESA activity (listing, permits, and so on) is notoriously slow. Without significant increases in funding, this proposal could open the floodgates to applications of little or no conservation merit, and many of these applications would, by default, be approved.
In its proposal, the FWS (2003a) marshals a number of cases in which trade is believed to have enhanced the survival of a managed wild population of an endangered species: for instance, Markhor sheep, which are hunted as trophies, and a variety of crocodilian species (but see Thorbjarnarson 1999) . However, the FWS does not show that such cases are the norm or even that they are more common than those in which trade increases the threat of extinction to an endangered species. There is no simple way to tell when commercial trade will lead to a conservation benefit or when the same trade, under different circumstances, will lead to greater threat. Numerous variables affect the consequences of an extractive activity. Among them are the biology of the species, the ability to control and regulate legal and illegal hunting, the stability and function of local and national governments, and the level and complexity of threats facing a population. That different species, or even different populations of a species, can be variably affected by economic activities is well established and recognized in international agreements such as those implemented by CITES, the International Whaling Commission, and numerous fisheries.
The debate between those who feel that trade should be more tightly regulated and those who advocate opening up trade in endangered species is not new; many such battles have been fought in successive meetings of the CITES Conference of the Parties. Those arguing for increased trade consistently make the same argument as those pushing for relaxed importing regulations: Where uncertainty exists, a precautionary approach demands fewer, rather than more, restrictions on trade. This debate has been central in the ongoing revision of the key criteria by which species are listed under CITES.
In some ways, the timing of the changes proposed by the US government could not be worse. Terrorism worries have led to greater regulation and monitoring of shipments into the United States. This presents a tremendous opportunity to conduct an unplanned but welcome "experiment" in reducing the illegal trade in wildlife. A small but focused increase in funding to the US Customs Bureau, the Department of Agriculture, and the FWS would allow them to better interdict existing illegal trade. This would benefit ESAlisted species from foreign countries and would protect domestic wildlife and the American public from exotic animalborne diseases. Instead of relaxing the rules and regulations governing the importation of listed species, the federal government should be taking this opportunity to improve enforcement of the ESA, limiting trade in endangered species unless, as the writers of the act intended, enhancement of survival can be proven.
